1 provides for the resulting (conjunctive) hypothesis H & X. For instance, intuitively, the return of Halley's comet in 1758 (E) confirmed Newton's theory (H) of universal gravitation (relative to the background evidence (K) available at the time). But, according to the H-D account of confirmation, this implies that the return of Halley's comet also confirms the conjunction of H and (say) Coulomb's Law (or any other proposition(s) one would like to conjoin to H). And, no matter how many irrelevancies are conjoined to H, E will continue to confirm the conjunction, according to the H-D account of confirmation.
Because probabilistic correlation is not monotonic, Bayesian (incremental) confirmation does not have the property expressed in (1). That is, according to Bayesianism, it does not follow from E's confirming H that E must also confirm H &X, for any X. For contemporary Bayesians, "E confirms H relative to K" just means that for an appropriate Bayesian probability function Pr (for an agent), Pr(H | E & K) > Pr(H | K) . And, in lots of cases, evidence E may confirm a hypothesis H in this probabilistic way without confirming some conjunction H & X -i.e., without also making Pr(H & X | E & K) > Pr(H & X | K) . So, Bayesianism is immune from the original problem of irrelevant conjunction. However, Bayesian confirmation does still suffer from this problem in the case of deductive evidence. That is, Bayesian confirmation and H-D confirmation both satisfy the following special case of (1), provided that E is less than certain on K -i.e., provided that Pr(E | K) < 1.
(1 ) If H & K E, then E confirms H & X relative to K, for any X.
That is, when H & K E we have, for any X,
. This is the traditional way of framing the problem of irrelevant conjunction.
Existing Bayesian Resolutions of the Traditional Problem. Several
Bayesians have tried to resolve the traditional problem of irrelevant conjunction by proving various quantitative results about the degree to which E confirms H versus H & X (relative to K) in the case of deductive evidence. One obvious Bayesian move is to point out that for any X, Pr(H | E&K) ≥ Pr(H &X | E&K), and that given H & K E, equality holds in the special case where Pr(X | H & K) = 1. So, in the deductive case H is always made at least as probable as H & X by E (relative to K), and in most cases is made more probable.
Although this may appear to solve the problem of irrelevant conjunction, the solution turns on the trivial fact that conjunctions are never more probable than their conjuncts. And it turns on reading the "confirms more" relation as the "makes more probable than" relation. But this is not a good interpretation of the "confirms more" relation. For, on this reading, when we compare the confirmation of hypotheses by evidence in more general cases it will often happen that "E confirms H 2 more strongly than E confirms H 1 (relative to K)" (because
, while E actually lowers the probability of
. So, the brute comparison of the relative sizes of posterior probabilities is intuitively an unappealing way to cash out the "confirms more" relation (see Popper 1954 for an early and forceful argument for this claim).
How then are we to cash out "confirms more"? Clearly, we want to employ some measure of how much the posterior probability of H is raised by E over its prior probability. I will call such measures relevance measures. Several relevance measures of confirmation have occurred to Bayesians (see Kyburg 1983 , Fitelson 1999 , and Festa 1999 for surveys). The most common are the ratio measure, the difference measure, and the likelihood-ratio measure. The ratio measure would measure the amount by which E confirms H (relative to K) as the ratio r(H,
This measure would have it that E confirms H 2 more strongly than H 1 (relative to K) just when the ratio r(H 2 , E | K) is larger than the ratio r(H 1 , E | K). The difference measure gauges the degree to which E confirms H (relative to K) in terms of the difference
Finally, according to the likelihoodratio measure, the degree to which E confirms H (relative to K) is given by the likelihood ratio
3 And, according to l, E confirms H 2 more strongly than E confirms H 1 just in case the ratio l(H 2 , E | K) is larger than the ratio l(H 1 , E | K). There is much controversy in the literature as to which of these three measures (or some other measure altogether 4 ) is the "one true (relevance) measure of (incremental) confirmation". No clear consensus has been reached amongst Bayesians (see Fitelson 2001 for an extended discussion of this controversy and some attempts to resolve it). Until such a consensus is reached, the best policy is to look for highly robust solutions to problems involving these measures -solutions that hold (simultaneously) for as many of the competing relevance measures as possible.
With regard to the problem of irrelevant conjunction, Earman's analysis employs the difference measure d. Earman (1992, 63-65) proves the following:
In other words, Earman argues that, while E does (from a Bayesian point of 3 I am using overbars to indicate (classical) logical negations of propostions (e.g., 'X' is to be read 'not X'). It is easy to show that
. So, like d and r, the likelihood ratio measure l is a function solely of the posterior and prior of H, and l can be thought of as a measure of "the degree to which E raises the probability of H (relative to K)". It may also help to think of the likelihood ratio l as the ratio of the posterior to the prior odds of H (given K). See Good 1985 for a nice discussion concerning the likelihood-ratio measure and its rather illustrious history.
4 There are many other candidates in the literature. Recently, Joyce (1999) and Christensen (1999) 
. Some of the salient properties of s are discussed in detail in Fitelson 2000 and Fitelson 2001. 3 view) continue to confirm H & X in the case of deductive evidence, the degree to which E confirms H & X will be less than the degree to which E confirms H (relative to background evidence K). And, as more and more irrelevant conjuncts are added, the degree to which E confirms the conjunction will tend to decrease. Earman's Bayesian approach to this problem is sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation -sensitive to precisely which function r, d, l, or some other function, is employed to represent the amount by which E confirms H (relative to K). That is, in Fitelson 1999 and Fitelson 2001 , it is shown that (2) is not true if the difference measure d is replaced by the ratio r of the posterior probability of H (on E) to the prior probability of H (relative to K).
5 But, because Earman's (2) holds for all other Bayesian relevance measures that have been proposed, his argument can be inoculated against the measure sensitivity problem simply by providing compelling reasons to reject the ratio measure of degree of confirmation (see Fitelson 2001 and Fitelson 2002 for several such reasons). However, it seems to me that Earman's analysis of irrelevant conjunction has other, more telling shortcomings.
A closer look at (2) reveals that the irrelevance of X is absent from the Bayesian analysis and resolution of the problem of irrelevant conjunction. What (2) says is that, when H & K E, as conjuncts X (simpliciter ) are added to H, the degree to which E confirms H & X will tend to decrease. As far as (2) is concerned, a conjunct X could be (intuitively) relevant to H and E, but this would not prevent the conjunction H & X from being less strongly confirmed than H by E. This is unfortunate, for two reasons. First, it was supposed to be the irrelevant X's that made (1) and (1 ) seem so unattractive. It's not so obvious that either (1) or (1 ) is incorrect in the case of highly positively relevant X's. Moreover, Bayesian confirmation theory is founded on a perfectly precise and intuitive kind of relevance (viz., correlation), which is not mentioned anywhere in the "Bayesian" statements or resolutions of the problem of irrelevant conjunction. So, Bayesians who endorse Earman's resolution (grounded in (2)) have apparently both (i ) lost track of which X's were supposed to make (1) and (1 ) seem so unintuitive; and, in the process, (ii ) forsaken the very notion of relevance that undergirds their own theory of confirmation. Rosenkrantz (1994) does seem somewhat sensitive to these points. Rosenkrantz motivates his (alternative) Bayesian resolution of the problem of irrelevant conjunction, as follows.
6
On H-D accounts, H is confirmed by a verified prediction, E, but E is equally a prediction of H & X, where the 'tacked on' X may be a quite extraneous hypothesis. . . . There are those who think that this sin of 'irrelevant conjunction' vitiates Bayesian confirmation theory 5 The ratio measure of degree of confirmation has been used and defended by many philosophers of science (see, e.g., Milne 1996) . Earman (1992) has an argument of his own against the ratio measure, but (as Milne (1996) points out) this argument begs the question in the context of the problem of irrelevant conjunction. In Fitelson 2001 and Fitelson 2002 , several compelling arguments against the ratio measure are presented and discussed.
6 I have translated Rosenkrantz's (1994, 470-471) passage into my notation and added bracketed summary remarks in my parlance.
as well. . . . I hope you will agree that the two extreme positions on this issue are equally unpalatable, (i) that a consequence E of H confirms H not at all, and (ii) that E confirms H &X just as strongly as it confirms H alone. . . . In general, intuition expects intermediate degrees of confirmation that depend on the degree of compatibility of H with X. Measuring degree of confirmation by
, in the case of deductive evidence]. (Rosenkrantz 1994, 470-471) In other words, Rosenkrantz suggests that we should measure the degree to which E confirms H (relative to K) by taking the difference (d) between the posterior probability of H (on E) and the prior probability of H (relative to K). Then, Rosenkrantz bases his alternative Bayesian resolution of the problem of irrelevant conjunction on the following theorem (which is really just a way of precisely filling out Earman's (2)): In addition, Rosenkrantz's account makes use of a strange -and decidedly non-Bayesian -notion of "relevance." Rosenkrantz seems to be suggesting that a conjunct X should be considered "irrelevant" to H (relative to background
8 This suggestion is inadequate for two reasons. First, since when do Bayesians think that the degree to which X is relevant to H can be measured using only the conditional probability Pr(X | H & K)? Secondly, the inequality Pr(X | H &K) < 1 can, at best, only tell us when X is "irrelevant" to H -it can say nothing about whether X is "irrelevant" to E, or to various logical combinations of H and E. It seems to me that the cases in which (1) and (1 ) are least intuitive are cases in which X is (intuitively) irrelevant to both H and E, and to all logical combinations of H and E. Indeed, it seems to me that an adequate Bayesian solution to the problem of irrelevant conjunction should be directly extendable to non-deductive cases, and should draw on a probabilistic notion of the relevance of X. The deductive case should turn out to be just a special case of a more general rule governing confirmationally irrelevant conjunctions. Thus, I suggest that we need a new understanding of the problem of irrelevant conjunction, as seen from a Bayesian perspective.
A New Bayesian Perspective and
Resolution. I suggest that we go about this in an entirely different way. Let's start by saying what it means (in a Bayesian framework) to say that X is confirmationally irrelevant to H, E, and all logical combinations of H and E. Then, once we have this precisely defined, let's see if (and under what auxiliary assumptions) we can show that such irrelevant conjuncts lead to decreased confirmational power. The first of these tasks is already done. Bayesians already have a perfectly precise definition of confirmational irrelevance: probabilistic independence. So, let's say that A is confirmationally irrelevant to B (relative to K) just when A and B are probabilistically independent (given K) -i.e., when Pr(
Therefore, we already know what it means (in a Bayesian confirmation-theoretic framework) to say that X is confirmationally irrelevant to H, E, and all logical combinations H and E. The next step is to note that Bayesian confirmation theory does fall prey to its own general, qualitative problem of irrelevant conjunction. That is, we have the following theorem (hereafter, "confirms" is used in the Bayesian, relevance sense -see the Appendix for proofs of theorems):
Theorem 1. If E confirms H, and X is confirmationally irrelevant to H, E, and H & E (relative to K), then E also confirms H & X (relative to K).
I claim that this is the "problem of irrelevant conjunction" that Bayesian confirmation theorists should be worrying about. The good news is that we can prove the following quantitative theorem, which seems to be the relevant result for Bayesian confirmation theory and the problem of irrelevant conjunction: 
Theorem 2. If E confirms H, and X is confirmationally irrelevant to H, E, and H
Our Bayesian analysis and resolution of the problem of irrelevant conjunction has the following advantages over its existing rivals:
• Our analysis makes use of the irrelevance of X. Moreover, our notion of confirmational irrelevance is not some peculiar one (like Rosenkrantz's), but just the standard Bayesian notion of probabilistic independence.
• Our resolution is not restricted to the (not very inductively interesting) special case of deductive evidence; it explains why irrelevant conjuncts are confirmationally disadvantageous in all contexts (deductive or otherwise).
• Our resolution is as robust (i.e., measure-insensitive) as any other existing resolution (e.g., Earman's), and more robust than any other existing account that tries to be sensitive to the "irrelevance" of the conjunct X (e.g., Rosenkrantz's) . That is, our account is based on a theorem which holds for all Bayesian measures of confirmation currently being used in the philosophical literature, except for the ratio measure r. , it is shown that our Theorem 2 holds for all Bayesian measures of degree of confirmation currently used or defended in the philosophical literature, except for the ratio measure r. Apparently, r cannot be used to resolve the problem of irrelevant conjunctioneven in cases that do not involve deductive evidence. This shows an even deeper problem with r than the (mere) "deductive insensitivity," which prevents r from satisfying Earman's (2) (see Fitelson 2001, §2.2.2.1 and §2.3 .1 for further discussion). Defenders of r (e.g., Milne (1996) ) are quick to point out that r's (mis)handling of the traditional, deductive problem of irrelevant conjunction is not such a serious weakness of r. Indeed, Milne (1996) characterizes the traditional problem of irrelevant conjunction as a "wretched shibboleth" in this context. I am somewhat sympathetic to this point of view. Deductive cases are not terribly interesting from an inductive-logical point of view. However, I think that r's mishandling of irrelevant conjuncts in the inductive case (as in our Theorem 2) ought to be taken more seriously. See Fitelson 2001 for further problems with the ratio measure r, and a critical analysis of Milne's (1996) desideratum/explicatum argument in favor of r. 
Proof. The proof of this theorem is easy.
11 We assume without loss of generality that K is tautologous, and we reason as follows:
Therefore, in the case of irrelevant conjunct X and confirmatory evidence E,
, which completes the proof. 
B Proof of Theorem 2

(H, E | K) = r(H & X, E | K)).
Proof. For the c = d case of the theorem (indeed, for all three cases), we assume without loss of generality that K is tautologous, and we reason as follows: 11 In the Appendix we will assume that all relevant conditional probabilities are defined. In fact, we may assume that all probabilities involved are non-extreme (this leads to no real loss of generality, since what we're talking about are inductive cases of irrelevant conjunction).
For the c = r case of the theorem, we will prove that r(H, E) = r(H & X, E), when X is an irrelevant conjunct (hence, that r violates the theorem). We are now ready to prove the likelihood-ratio (l) case of the theorem (via reductio ad absurdum, using the d and r results as lemmas, and using algebraic manipulations without comment).
